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Abstract 
An ordinal view of independence is studied in the 
framework of possibility theory. We investigate 
three possible definitions of dependence, of 
increasing strength. One of them is the counterpart 
to the multiplication law in probability theory, and 
the two others are based on the notion of 
conditional possibility. These two have enough 
expressive power to support the whole possibility 
theory, and a complete axiomatization is provided 
for the strongest one. Moreover we show that weak 
independence is well-suited to the problems of 
belief change and plausible reasoning, especially to 
address the problem of blocking of property 
inheritance in exception-tolerant taxonomic 
reasoning. 
0 INTRODUCTION 
The notion of epistemic independence can be studied in the 
framework of reasoning under uncertainty. It can be derived 
naturally using conditioning: "C is independent of A iff 
one's opinion about C is not affected by the fact of 
knowing A." Dually, we say that C depends on A if it is 
not the case that C is independent of A. A synonymous 
expression for "C depends on A" is "A is relevant for C'. 
Traditionally, the formal basis of the dependence relation 
(also called relevance relation) is conditional probability: 
Given two events A and C and a probability measure 
Prob, C is (probabilistically) independent of A iff 
Prob(CIA) = Prob(C). 
In this paper we show that independence based on 
possibility theory (Zadeh 1978, Dubois and Prade 1988) 
has quite different properties. We present three definitions 
of independence and study their formal properties. We call 
them unrelatedness, strong and weak independence. We 
show that strong independence has enough expressive 
power to support the whole possibility theory, and we 
give a complete ax.iomatization not explicitly involving 
the underlying uncertainty theory. Then we apply these 
notions to the problems of belief revision and exception­
tolerant reasoning. 
Throughout the paper A, B, C, D and E stand for events 
belonging to a Boolean algebra of subsets of a set Q.We 
use the symbols: conjunction A, disjunction v, and 
negation ...,. True and False are propositional constants 
denoting the true and false events respectively. 
1 PROBABILISTIC INDEPENDENCE 
1. 1 The Multiplication Law 
The standard definition of probabilistic independence is via 
the Multiplication Law: A and C are probabilistically 
independent iff Prob(AAC ) = Prob(A) * Prob(C). A priori 
we find it more natural to define independence as : C is 
probabilistically independent of A iff Prob(C IA) = 
Prob(C ), relying thus on conditioning. In fact this 
conditioning-based notion of independence is equivalent to 
the multiplication law. It follows from the axioms of 
probability theory that independence defined in this way is 
a symmetric relation, and that it is not sensitive to 
negation. In other words: 
(symmetry) If C is independent of A then A i s  
independent of C. 
(negation) If C is independent of A then C IS 
independent of ...,A. 
Symmetry justifies to say "A and C are independent" 
instead of "A is independent of C". Moreover we have 
(truth) A and True are independent. 
Note that there are no such simple properties governing 
the interplay of independence with conjunction and 
disjunction. 
The above properties are not enough to completely 
characterize the notion of probabilistic independence. To 
get completeness we need two more axioms (Kolmogorov 
1956), cited in (Fine 1973): 
(prob v) If A and B are independent, A and C are 
independent and B and C are mutually exclusive, 
then A and BvC are independent. 
(prob A) If A and B are independent, C and D are 
independent, B � D and A � C then AAB � 
CAD. 
Hence the ax.iomatisation of dependence involves not only 
logical truth, but also a qualitative probability relation 
"�". It follows that - at least for the simple definition via 
conditioning - we cannot study the formal properties of 
probabilistic dependence separately from the probabilistic 
framework. 
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The Multiplication Law has been criticized by several 
authors. R. von Mises (1964) has argued that the 
Multiplication Law could be fulfilled just because of "pure 
numerical accidents", although A and B are not intuitively 
independent in the sense of 'being separated' or 'not 
influencing each other'. He gives an example where 
Prob(A) = Prob(B) = Prob(C) = Prob(D) = 1/4, and A, B, 
C and D are pairwise mutually exclusive. Then he 
investigates whether AvB and BvC are independent. 
According to von Mises they are intuitively dependent 
(because they have B in common), whereas the 
Multiplication Law says that they are independent. 
H. Reichenbach ( 1949) has argued that dependence and 
independence should be ternary rather than binary relations, 
where the third element in the relation is the evidence on 
which we declare that A and C are independent. From the 
ternary relation we can get back the binary one as follows: 
A and C are independent if! there is some evidence E such 
that A and C are independent on evidence E. We do not 
treat ternary relations in the sequel except in the last 
section. Nevertheless our analysis carries over to the 
ternary case. In the rest of the section we formally present 
two important principles that are not validated by the 
Multiplication Law. 
1. 2 Conjunction and (in)dependence 
A formal objection to the multiplication Law has been 
given by J. M. Keynes (1921, cited in (Giirdenfors 1978)). 
According to Keynes, the following conjunction criterion 
for dependence (called conjunction criterion for relevance in 
(Giirdenfors 1978)) should be valid: 
(CCD) If C depends on A, and C depends on B then C 
depends on At\13. 
He notes that (CCD) is not validated by the Multiplication 
Law. Keynes proposes a stronger definition of 
probabilistic independence that does it: Cis independent of 
A iff there is noB such that A implies Band Prob(CIB) ;t: 
Prob(C). R. Carnap (1950) has shown that this definition 
leads to a trivial notion of independence: It entails that C 
depends on A as soon as C and A are consistent. 
Giirdenfors (1978) has suggested a conjunction criterion for 
independence dual to (CCD): 
(CCI) If C is independent of A, and C is independent of 
B then C is independent of AAB. 
is a natural principle that should be valid. Gardenfors 
criticizes the Multiplication Law because it does not 
guarantee this principle, and investigates a series of 
stronger definitions of independence. He finally comes up 
with: C is independent of A iff Prob(A) == 0, or 
Prob(CIAAB) = Prob(C)forall B such that Prob(AAB) > 0 
and Prob(C IB) = Prob(C ). This definition validates (CCI). 
Note that Gardenfors' independence relation is non­
symmetric. Here we show that in an ordinal setting where 
uncertainty is described by ordering the states of the world 
by their plausibility, we capture similar regularities in 
terms of disjunction, in a much simpler way. 
2 POSSIBILITY THEORY 
We introduce the notions of possibility measure and 
distribution and of conditional possibility. 
2. 1 Possibility Measures 
Possibility measures allow to associate an uncertainty 
degree to the elements of the set of events. Following 
e.g., Dubois and Prade (1986), a function ll from 20. into 
the real interval [0, 1] is a possibility measure if it satisfies 
the following axioms: 
I1(True) > IT(False) ; I1(AvB) = max(TI(A),TI(B)) 
Any totally ordered set can stand for the unit interval, that 
we keep here for the sake of simplicity. By convention 
I1(True) == 1, IT(False) = 0. ITCA) = 1 only means that A is 
possibly true, while I1(A) = 0 means that A is certainly 
false. Particularly, when ITCA) = TIC-.A) = 1, it means 
total ignorance about the truth of A. The basic max­
decomposability axiom is due to the purely ordinal 
setting. It can also be viewed as enforcing IT(A u B) to its 
lowest bound since for any reasonable confidence measure, 
we should have "if A implies B then IT(A) � I1(B)". Note 
that n cannot be decomposable with respect to 
conjunction because TI(AA...,A) = 0 for all A, but IT(A) = 
f1(-,A) = 1 is permitted. Moreover, max(IT(A),IJ(-,A)) = 
I1(True), since Av-,A = True. The quantity N(A) == 1 -
IJ( ..,A) is called the necessity of A, and represents a level 
of certainty, or acceptance of A. Especially N(A) > 0 
means that A is accepted, while ..,A is not (since N(A) > 0 
entails N(•A) = 0 in the absence of inconsistency). And 
we have the reasonable axiom of acceptance saying that if 
A is accepted and so is B, then AAB is accepted too, since 
N(AAB) == min(N(A),N(B)) holds. Note that the fact that A 
is not accepted (N(A) = 0) does not entail that it is rejected 
(which is expressed by N(...,A) > 0). 
In the finite case a possibility measure can be represented 
by a possibility distribution 1t on 0. the set of 
interpretations of the language. Namely IT(A) = 
sup{n{ro) I w I= A}. 1t encodes a complete partial ordering 
of interpretations, with the intended meaning that if n(ro) 
> n(w'), ro is a more plausible description of the current 
situation than ro'. Reasoning in the setting of possibility 
theory comes down to assume that the current situation is 
always one of the most plausible ones. Accepting A (N(A) 
> 0) means that I1(A) > f1(-,A), i.e., that "normally A 
should be true". This way of modelling uncertainty is in 
full accordance with Shoham (1988)'s view of preferential 
logic, Lehmann (1989)'s notion of ranked models, also 
encoded in Pearl ( 1990)'s system Z. See (Benferhat et al. 
1992). Especially N(A) > 0 can be written True lv A in 
the terminology of conditional assertions in Lehmann's 
rational nonmonotonic setting. True lv A means "A is 
plausibly true" (unconditionally). 
Every possibility measure induces a relation "�" defined 
by A � B if and only if ll(A) � I1(B). We call � a 
relation agreeing strictly with IT. A � B is read "A is at 
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least as possible as B". This relation is called qualitative 
possibility ordering and satisfies the following conditions: 
{non triviality) True >False 
(tautology) True;:: A 
(transitivity) if A ;:: B and B ;:: C then A ;:: C 
(disjunctiveness) AvC � A  or AvC �C. 
(dominance) If A implies B then A �  B 
Remark. Often, (disjunctiveness) is replaced by the two 
axioms of connectedness {A ;:: B or B ;:: A) and disjunctive 
stability (if A;:: B then AvC;:: BvC) 
That these conditions are sufficient follows from the 
following formal relation between possibility theory and 
qualitative possibility orderings (Dubois 1986): The only 
functions mapping events into [0, 1] which strictly agree 
with qualitative possibility orderings are possibility 
measures, and a strictly agreeing possibility measure 
always exists. In our presentation of possibility theory, 
this result can be expressed as follows: 
Theorem (soundness and completeness of qualitative 
possibility orderings). Let IT be any measure on n, and ;:: 
any binary relation on the subsets of n. Then IT is a 
possibility measure iff ;:: is a qualitative possibility 
ordering. 
Conditional possibility relations first appear in Lewis 
(1973)'s logics of counterfactuals whose semantics are 
systems of spheres. But as indicated in Dubois and Prade 
(1991) a system of spheres is equivalent to a possibility 
distribution. Formal links between possibility theory and 
conditional logics are studied in Farinas del Cerro and 
Herzig (1991). Lastly, the dual qualitative certainty 
relation, equivalent to necessity measures (A ;;>:N C iff 
...,c ;:: -,A) is closely related to expectation-orderings of 
Gardenfors and Makinson (1994). The characteristic axiom 
of ;::N is 
(conjunctiveness) 
2 .  2 Conditional Possibility 
Following Hisdal ( 1978) and Dubois and Prade ( 1986, 
1992) the conditional possibility IT(CIA) is defined as the 
maximal solution of the equation IT(AAC) = min(fl(CIA), 
IT(A)). This definition is clearly inspired from Bayes' 
Rule, where min corresponds to the product. The choice of 
the maximal solution is due to the principle of minimal 
specificity which urges to select the least committed 
possibility measures, i.e. the one which allows each event 
to have the greatest possibility level: 
IT(CIA) = 1 if fl(A) = fl(A·'.C) 
IT(CIA) = Il(A .. \C) if fl(A) > fl(AAC) 
Facts. 
1. If Il(A) = 0 then fl(CIA) = I 
2. If fl(AAC) = I then fi(CIA) = 1 
3. If fl(A) > 0 and IT(C) = 0 then IT(CIA) = 0 
4. IT(ChC) = 1 iff fi(-q = 0 
5. Il(ChC) = 0 iff fi(...,C) > 0 
Some of these facts deserve some comments. Fact 1 
suggests that nothing is sure when assuming that a 
certainly false proposition is true (since in this case 
anything and its contrary is plausible). This leads to the 
convention IT(False I False)= I which does not agree with 
the non-triviality axiom (it is not compulsory anyway). 
Fact 2 says that if A and C are fully consistent, assuming 
A true keeps C possibly true. Fact 3 says that a certainly 
false proposition remains false via conditioning by a non­
certainly false proposition. However if IT(A) = 0 then the 
conditional possibility again disagrees with the non­
triviality axiom. 
In the next sections we present three different ordinal 
definitions of (in)dependence. Two of them are based on 
the notion of conditional possibility. We show that these 
two can express qualitative possibility, and that complete 
axiomatizations is given for one of them. We conjecture 
that this is not possible for the third one, originally due to 
Zadeh. In all three cases, a necessary condition for the 
independence of A and C will be that the conjunction AAC 
can be interpreted truth-functionally, in the sense that 
fl(AAC) =min (fl(A),fl(C)) for these particular events. 
The conditional necessity is N(...,CIA) = 1 - IT(CIA), 
defined by duality. Note that N(CIA) = N(-,AvC) if 
N(CIA) > 0. The following property will be used at length 
in the sequel: 
N(CIA) > 0 iff fl(AAC) > fl(AN·•C) 
N(CIA) > 0 means that C is accepted as true when A is 
assumed to be true. It corresponds to the conditional 
assertion A tv C in the sense of Lehmann's rational 
inference, and can be viewed as the (nonmonotonic) 
plausible entailment of C from A in the presence of an 
ordering of interpretations. The above clearly show that 
A tv C means AAC is more plausible than AA..,C (or 
equivalently fi(AAC) > fl(AA..,C) in terms of possibility 
measure). 
3 (UN)RELA TED NESS 
Zadeh (1978) has introduced a symmetric definition of 
independence called "non-interactivity" between 
possibilistic variables that is not based on conditional 
possibilities.This notion has also been studied by 
Nahmias (1978) for events, under the name 
"unrelatedness". 
(Def ""z) A and C are related propositions in lildeh's 
sense (denoted by A ""z C) iff Il(AAC) * 
min(fi(A),fl(C)). 
It is interesting to characterize the constraints induced by 
unrelatedness on the ordering of interpretations AAC, 
..,AAC, AA..,C, ...,AA..,C respectively. 
Proposition. A and C are unrelated if and only if 
fl(AAC);:: min(fl(AA-,C),IT(...,AAC)). 
Proof IT ( A A C) = min(max(Il(AAC ),Il( A A...,C ) ) ,  
max(fl(AAC),IT(..,AAC))). Clearly as soon as Il(AAC) :2: 
fl(AA..,C), unrelatedness holds. And the same when 
fl(AAC) ;;>: fiC-,AAC). However if Il(AAC) < IT(AA...,C) 
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and Il(A/\C) < IT(...,A/\C), then ITCA) = Il(A/\•C) and 
TICC) = I1(-,A/\C), and A and C are related. 
Clearly, A and C are related implies that A/\C is an 
implausible situation (since in any case it holds 
Il(A/\C) :::.:; min(IT(A),IT(C)) ), i.e., A and C are (more or 
less) mutually exclusive: 
Corollary. A and C are related if and only if N(...,CIA) > 
0 and N(-,AIC) > 0. 
On the contrary when A and C are unrelated the two 
propositions are totally allowed to be true together. 
Zadeh's independence is an extension of the logical notion 
of consistency. This notion is not very demanding. 
Moreover this notion is local in the sense that it is 
sensitive to negation: if A and C are unrelated, it does not 
say anything about the other literals ..,A and C, C and ..,A, 
-,c and -,A, Other properties are as follows. 
Facts. 
l .  A ""z C iff C ""z A 
2. If A ""z BvC then A ""z B or A ""z C 
3. If AvB ""z C then A ""z C or B ""z C 
(due to symmetry) 
4. If A ""z C and B ""z C then AvB ""z C 
5. If A ""z B and A ""z C then A ""z BvC 
(due to symmetry) 
6. False ::tz A (where ::tz means "not(-=z ))" 
7. True ::tz A 8. A ::tz A 
9. A ::tz -,A iff IT(A) = 0 or I1(-,A) = 0 ; 10. AvC "1:-z A 
Facts 2 and 3 are disjunction-oriented. However, none of 
the two conjunction criteria (CCD) and (CCI) are valid 
with unrelatedness. Note also that facts 8 and 10 is 
certainly a strange property for an independence relation. 
There seems to be no way to express I1 by means of ""z, 
the reason being that we cannot express Il(A) = 1. 
Therefore, we conjecture that (just as for probabilistic 
independence) ""Z cannot be axiomatized alone. 
4 STRONG INDEPENDENCE 
It is tempting to define dependence in possibility theory in 
a way similar to probability theory, namely to define C as 
independent of A when the conditional measure of C given 
A is equal to the unconditional measure of C. Here we 
have two uncertainty functions I1 and N. Hence we can 
define independence as ITCCIA) = Il(C) or 
N(CIA) = N(C). Notice that N(CIA) = N(C) is equivalent 
to IJ(-,CIA) = Il(...,C). In (Farinas and Herzig 1994a) the 
independence relation defined by ITCCIA) = [l(C) is 
studied. A complete axiomatisation has been given. 
Note that if Il(CIA) = Il(C) < 1 then we are in the 
situation where C is plausibly rejected (since fl(...,C) = 1 > 
ITCC)). Hence the meaning of IT(CIA) = Il(C) < 1 is that 
when A is assumed to be true, it does not affect the 
plausible rejection of C. This expresses the negative 
statement that accepting ...,c is independent of A. It 
suggests to use N(CIA) = N(C) in order to express a 
positive statement. Note that we also have 
Il(CIA) = I1(C) < 1 implies [1(-,CIA) = ITC...,C) = 1 
but not the converse. Hence fl(-,CIA) = ITC•C) = 1 is a 
very weak statement saying that not accepting C (i.e. 
N(C) = 0) is not questioned by fact A. In particular, 
I1(CIA) = I1(C) = IJ(-,CIA) = Il(...,C) = 1 (which is never 
met in the probabilistic case), means that in the presence 
of A, C, which was originally ignored, is still ignored. In 
this paper we shall restrict to independence of accepted 
propositions with respect to other propositions; 
independence of ignored propositions turns out to be a 
very distinct issue, as suggested by the following result: 
Proposition 4. 1. N(CIA) = N(C) iff either (i) 1 = 
max(I1(-,A/\...,C),I1(A/\-,C)), and Il(A/\...,q � Il(A/\C), or 
(ii) I1(A/\C) > IT(A"...,q � IJ(-,A/\...,C) 
Moreover, (i) is equivalent to N(CIA) = N(C) = 0, and (ii) 
is equivalent to N(CIA) = N(C) > 0. Note that the two 
situations (i) and (ii) correspond to (almost) reversed 
orderings of interpretations. We give the following 
definition of the strong independence relation: 
(Def "1:->) C is strongly independent of A (denoted by 
A "1:-> C) iff N(CIA) = N(C) > 0. 
Note that A "1:-> C indicates that in the context where A is 
true C is accepted. Due to what we said above, C is 
strongly independent of A iff ITC ...,CIA) = Il( •C) < I .  
In the next theorem we characterize a dependence relation 
"">=not("#>) without using conditional necessities. 
Theorem (construction of ""> from IT). Let IT be a 
possibility measure, and let ""> be defined from its dual N 
through (Def"l:->). 
l. A"�:-> C iff I1(A) > I1(-,q = IT(A/\•C) 
2. A ""> C iff [l(A) S: TIC •C) or IT( ...,C) > IT(A/\•C) 
Proof Follows directly from Proposition 4.1. 
Corollary. Let IT be a possibility measure, and let => 
be defined from IT through (Def "1:-> ). 
l .  A "1:-> C iff Il(A/\•C) = min(IT(A),[1(-,C)) and IT(•C) 
< I1(A). 
2. A""> C iff IT(A/\...,q :F- min(I1(A),I1(.C)) or [1(-,q � 
[1(A). 
3. If A "1:-> C then IT(A/\C) = min(Il(A),IT(C)). 
4. If IlC•C) � I1(A) then A""> C. 
Fa cts. 
1. If A""> B/\C then A -=> B or A""> C 
2. If A v B => C then A ""> C or B ""> C 
3.1f A""> C and B -=> C then AvB ""> C 
4. If A ""> B and A ""> C then A ""> B"C 
5. False ""> C 6. True "1:-> C iff N(C) > 0 
7. A => False 8. A "1:-> True iff [l(A) > 0 
9. A/\B ""> •B"C 10. If A implies -.c then A ""> C 
11. AvC "1:-> .C iff IJ(A) > IT(C) 
12. A"�:-> A iff N(A) = 1 ; 13. If Il(A) = 0 then A""> C 
14. If IT(C) = 1 then A "'> ·C 
15. A""> cor -,c ""> •A 
Let us comment on these facts. Facts 2 and 3 are similar 
to the (CCI) and (CCD) axioms except that disjunction is 
used instead of conjunction. Facts 1 and 4 are also similar 
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but the conjunction of influenced facts is considered 
instead of influencing facts. Fact 5 means that assuming a 
contradiction holds destroys all previously plausible 
propositions. On the contrary tautologies never affect the 
plausibility of already plausible propositions (Fact 6). 
Fact 7 is simply due to the impossibility to assert false 
propositions. Fact 8 says that we can only assert a 
tautology is plausible when taking for granted an 
impossible proposition. Fact 9 and 10 express equivalent 
properties. N amely if A implies that C is false then when 
learning that A is true affects our opinion about C when C 
was previously supposed to be plausible. Fact 11 shows 
that the possibilistic ordering can be translated in terms of 
strong independence. Fact 12 claims that the only case 
when the truth of A is independent of itself is when A is a 
tautology. Fact 13 is a more general statement than fact 5. 
Fact 14 holds because it cannot be the case that D(A) > 
I1(C). Similarly the reason for fact 15 is that TI(A) > 
D(•C) cannot go along with IT( .C)> TI(A). 
Clearly, probabilistic dependence and possi bilistic 
dependence are quite different concepts. Probabilistic 
properties such as symmetry ("If B depends on A then A 
depends on B") or transparency w.r.t. negation ("If B 
depends on A then B depends on •A'') do not hold in the 
possibilistic case. In other words, A i:-> B neither implies 
B i:-> A nor A i:-> •B. On the other hand, possibilistic 
dependence has some "nice" regularities such as 1., 2., 3., 
4., none of which holds in the probabilistic case. These 
regularities are quite close to the criteria (CCD) and (CCI). 
Concerning the expressivity of the dependence relation it 
is interesting to observe that it possesses the same 
expressivity as possibility theory itself. This follows from 
the next result. 
Theorem (construction of TI from i:->). Let TI be a 
possibility measure, and let i:-> be defined from TI. 
1. I1(A) >TI(C) iff AvC *>.C. 
2. ITCA) ::::rrcq iff Ave""> ·A. 
Proof By previous fact I I. 
The theorem can be read as follows: C is strictly less 
possible than A if and only if learning that AvC is true 
does not change my rejection of C. The theorem should 
not be surprizing since the meaning of independence is to 
enforce constraints on the ordering between interpretations 
as shown in Proposition 4.1. It turns out that such 
constraints are enough to identify a single ordering, i.e. a 
comparative necessity relation. 
Thus we are able to express qualitative possibility by 
means of strong independence. In a trivial manner, this 
correspondence enables us to obtain an axiomatization of 
the (in)dependence relation by translating the qualitative 
counterpart of possibility theory. N ote that this is in 
contrast with probability theory: There, the independence 
relation cannot completely capture qualitative probability 
(which in turn determines the probability measure). Here 
we give a simpler axiomatization of"">: 
( ""> 1) True *> True 
(o:> 2) A""> False 
(=> 3) If AvB ""> •B and BvC => ....C then AvC ""> -.c 
(=>4) A => •A 
(=> 5) If A => BAC then A"'> B or A""> C 
Theorem (soundness and completeness of the axiomatics 
of "'> w.r.t. possibility theory). Let => be a relation on 
events, and n a mapping from the set of events to [0,1] 
such that A i:-> C iff N(CIA) = N(C) > 0. Then => is a 
dependence relation iff N is a necessity measure. 
Proof From the right to the left, it is sufficient to prove 
that the above axioms (rewritten as qualitative necessities) 
are valid. Then we can use the soundness of qualitative 
necessity orderings w.r.t. possibility theory. From the left 
to the right, we prove that the axioms for qualitative 
necessity orderings are derivable from the above 
axiomatics (and then use the completeness of qualitative 
necessity orderings w.r.t. possibility theory). Using the 
previous theorem in terms of necessities, namely N(A) > 
N(C) iff •Av•C *>A; N(A);:: N(C) iff •Av•C "'> C 
we express qualitative necessities with "'>: 
1. (non triviality) True >N False becomes 
•Falsev•True *>True. 
It is equivalent to True*> True which is an instance of 
(=> 1). 
2. (transitivity) if A :=:N B and B :=:N C then A :=:N C 
becomes: If •Av•B "'>B and •Bv•C "'> C 
then •Av•C => Cwhich is("'> 3). 
3. (tautology) A �N True becomes •Av•True => True 
which is nothing else but(""> 2). 
4. (conjunctiveness) AA C :=:N A or AAC :=:N C 
becomes •(AAC)v•A => A or •(AAC)v•C => C, hence 
•A v....C ""> A or •A v•C ""> C. The latter can be proved 
combining •Av•C "'> AAC which is an instance of 
(""> 4), and: If •Av•C => AAC then •Av-,C "'> A or 
•Av-,C => C which is an instance of("'> 5). 
5. {dominance) can be replaced by 
(equivalence) If A H C then A �N C and 
(monotony) A :=:N AAC. 
The latter is translated to • Av•(AAC) => AAC, which is 
an instance of(=> 4). Hence what remains to prove is 
If A H C then •A v....C => C. 
N ow from A H C we get •C H •Av•C. From the latter 
we get (•C "'> C iff •Av•C "'>C). Then •Av•C "'> C 
follows from(""> 4). 
Remark. It is important to note that => is quite close to 
a qualitative possibility ordering: Replacing A "='> C by 
TI(A) � TI(•C) all our principles are possibilistically 
valid. In particular (connectedness) can be deduced from the 
axioms: From('""> 4) and("'> 5) we can get AvC =>·A 
or AvC => •C (see above). 
The other way round, the only (qualitative) axiom for �N 
that apparently does not follow from the above axioms is 
that of transitivity. As on the other hand we know by the 
above Corollary that A i:-> C implies TI(A) >TIC .....C), we 
obtain that for a given n. *> is a fragment of the 
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corresponding strict possibility ordering. This fragment is 
closed under all the axioms of possibility theory except 
that of transitivity. 
5 WEAK INDEPENDENCE 
The notion of strong independence may be felt too strong 
because what we may wish to express is a more qualitative 
notion of independence. Now, strong independence requires 
that not only C remains more plausible than -,c when A 
is known to be true, but its level of acceptance should not 
be altered. This last requirement forces the inequality 
fl(A/\...,C);:: fi(-,A/\...,C) which implies that in the context 
where C would be false, it is forbidden to conclude that 
-,A should be accepted (see Fact 15 of the previous 
section). Hence we have the property 
C is strongly independent of A if and only if N(CIA) > 0 
and ...,(N( ·AhC) > 0). 
A milder notion of independence is that if C is accepted 
unconditionally, then if A is true, C remains accepted; 
then we do away with any commitment in the case when 
C would turn out to be false. Hence the following 
definition: 
(Def #>w) C is weakly independent of A 
(denoted A #>w C) iffN(CIA) > 0 and N(C) > 0. 
Proposition 5.1. A #>w C iff I1(A/\C) > fl(A/\ • C )  
and max(I1(C/\A),I1(C/\-,A)) > fl(...,A/\•C ). 
Proof Indeed A#>w C is equivalent to I1(A/\C) > 
I1(A/\...,C), I1CC) 
= 
1 
= 
max(I1(C/\A), I1(C/\-,A)) > 
I1(A/\...,C) and max(I1(C/\A),I1(C/\•A)) > I1C•A/\...,C), the 
first of which is redundant. Q.E.D. 
Proposition 5.2. A -:t=> C iff A #>w C and fl(A/\•C)= 
IJ(...,C). (Obvious using Proposition 4.1.) 
Proposition 5.3. A #w C implies A #>z C. 
Proof Obvious since I1(A/\C) > fl(A/\ ...,q, and then 
fl(A) = fl(A/\C) :::; I1(C). 
However it is not true that, as for strong independence 
A #>w C implies I1(A/\-,q = min(I1(A),f1C...,C)) 
since weak independence does not involve ll(A/\...,C). 
It can be checked that weak independence satisfies Facts 1, 
2, etc. of the previous section except for a few ones, 
namely Fact 12, which becomes A #>w A iff N(A) > 0, 
and Fact 15. The latter is not surprizing since weak 
independence is meant to let the relationship between 
N(AIB) > 0 and N(...,BhA) > 0 loose. Hence it is possible 
to have A #>w C and -,c #>w ...,A. This occurs precisely 
when IT(...,A/\C) > max(Il(A/\C), fi(...,A/\...,C)) and 
min(I1(A/\C),IJ(-,A/\-,C)) > I1(A/\...,C). Besides, weak 
independence satisfies stronger forms of Facts 3 and 4 : 
3'. if A "">w C or B "">w C then AvB "'>w C 
4'. if A "'>w B orA ""->w C then A "">w B/\C 
Lastly we have the following remarkable property 
VA,C, Av-,C #>w C iff Av....C #> C 
Indeed if Av...,C #>w C, then N(CIAv....C) > 0 is such that 
N(CIAv....C) = N((...,A/\C)vC) = N(C). 
Hence when C is weakly independent of A then it is also 
strongly independent of A as soon as ...,c 1-- A. As a 
consequence, it is easy to see that the theorem that 
constructs a possibility measure from the independence 
relation also holds when we change the strong 
independence into the weak independence. In fact only the 
part of the strong independence relation that is equivalent 
to weak independence is useful to recover the underlying 
possibility measure. However if ....C 1-- A does not hold, A 
#>w C does not enforce an inequality between I1(C) and 
fl(...,A) generally. Finally the six axioms that characterize 
strong independence with respect to possibilistic semantics 
also hold for weak independence, but more axioms are 
necessary to completely characterize weak independence. 
Let us show how weak independence can be related to the 
framework of belief revision (Gii.rdenfors, 1988). A central 
problem for the theory of belief revision is what is meant 
by a minimal change of a state of belief. As pointed out in 
Gardenfors (1990), "the criteria of minimality that have 
been used [in the models for belief change] have been 
based on almost exclusively logical considerations. 
However, there are a number of non-logical factors that 
should be important when characterizing a process of 
belief revision". Gardenfors focuses the notion of 
dependence (he uses the synonymous term 'relevance') and 
proposes the following criterion: If a belief state K is 
revised by a sentence A, then all sentences in K that are 
independent of the validity of A should be retained in the 
revised state of belief 
This seems to be a very natural requirement for belief 
revision operations, as well as a useful tool when it comes 
to implement belief change operations. As noted by 
Gardenfors, "a criterion of this kind cannot be given a 
technical formulation in a model based on belief sets built 
up from sentences in a simple propositional language 
because the notion of relevance is not available in such a 
language." However the above criterion does make sense 
in the ordinal setting of possibility theory. 
We suppose given a theory K and an AGM revision 
operation * (Giirdenfors, 1988). K* A represents the result 
of revising K by A. According to Gardenfors and 
Makinson's characterization theorem, K and * can be 
represented equivalently by an epistemic entrenchment 
ordering, which in turn is nothing else than a qualitative 
necessity ordering. It can be proved that in terms of 
possibility theory the fact that C belongs to K* A is 
equivalent to having N(CIA) > 0 (Dubois and Prade, 
1992); moreover C belongs to K is equivalent to N(C) > 
0. If we translate the definition of the weak independence 
relation #>w in terms of revision we get 
A #>w C iff C E K and C E K* A 
which is exactly Gardenfors' above requirement for 
revision-based independence. Clearly, a companion 
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definition of a dependence relation "">- associated to a 
given qualitative necessity ordering can be defined via the 
following condition from a given AGM contraction 
operation (-): 
(Cond ::=>-) A ::=>- C iff C E K and C tl: K-A 
iff N(C) > 0 and N(A) � N(AvC). 
This alternative notion is studied in (Farinas and Herzig, 
1994b). The comparative analysis of revision-based and 
contraction-based notions of independence is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
6 COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION 
We have analysed three notions of (in)dependence that can 
be defined in possibility theory. A common feature to all 
of them is that the independence of A and C requires that 
the conjunction of A and C is interpreted truth­
functionally. In other words, we have 
A :F> C implies A :t>w C ; A :F.>w C implies A :F.z C 
Hence, all notions of independence share the property 
Il(AAC) = min(IT(A),Il(C)). Moreover, we have shown 
that 
A :t:.> C iff A :F.z •C and fl(•C) < fl(A) 
A :F.> C iff A :F.>w C and IT(AA•C)= fl(.C) 
We now examine the validity of Keynes-Giirdenfors criteria 
of Section l in the ordinal setting of possibility theory. 
Namely the following requirements: 
(CCD) If A ""> C and B => C then AAB => C 
(CCI) If A :F> C and B :F> C then AAB :t> C 
Also consider symmetric counterparts of CCD and CCI: 
(CCD-r) If A ::=> B and A => C then A => BAC 
(CCI-r) If A :F> B and A :F> C then A :t> BAC 
and the corresponding properties changing conjunction 
into disjunction (DCD, DCI, etc). 
(DCI) 
(DCI-r) 
(DCD) 
(DCD-r) 
If A :t> C and B :t> C then AvB :t> C 
If A :F.> B and A :F.> C then A :F.> BvC 
If A ""> C and B ""> C then A v B ""> C 
If A ""> B and A ""> C then A => BvC 
First the relatedness property of Zadeh :tz satisfies the four 
above criteria concerning disjunctions. (CCD-r), (CCI-r), 
(DCI) (DCD) hold for strong and weak independence. The 
weak independence has the following stronger property: 
A :F>w BAC iff A :t>w B and A :F.>w C 
AvB :F->w C iff A :t>w C and B :t>w C 
that is (DCI) and (CCI-r) with equivalence, due to Facts 3' 
and 4' of Section 5. This is natural if weak independence is 
considered in terms of belief revision: if we continue to 
accept BAC upon learning A we should continue to accept 
C and B as well. 
We could have introduced as well a ternary dependence 
relation "B and C are independent, given A", as studied by 
Giirdenfors (1978, 1990) and Pearl ( 1988). For reasons of 
simplicity we have restricted our analysis to binary 
dependence relations here, but it is clear that a ternary 
relation is certainly the most general one. This will be 
subject of further investigations. 
7 APPLICATION TO EXCEPTION­
TOLERANT REASONING 
Possibility theory is a natural framework for handling 
nonmonotonic reasoning problems, because it embeds 
what Lehmann calls rational inference (see Benferhat et al., 
1992). Given a set of rules modelled by pairs of 
propositional formulas, it is possible to rank-order these 
exception-tainted rules in terms of their relative 
specificity. This ranking of rules generates an ordering of 
interpretations that can be encoded as a possibility 
distribution. 
The algorithm for ranking rules (or interpretations) has 
been proposed by Lehmann, and also in a different form by 
Pearl. Benferhat et al. (1992) have shown that this 
ordering can be retrieved by means of the least specific 
possibility distribution that is consistent with the rules. 
Namely let K be a conditional knowledge base where rules 
are of the form Ai l'v Bi (read if A 1 is true, B1 is plausibly 
true). Each rule is interpreted as the constraint N(BiiAj) >0 
or equivalently IT(A1AB1) > IT(A1A•B1). Then the ranking 
of the interpretation obtained by considering the maximal 
element of the set { 1t, fl(AiAB1) > Il(AiA'Bi), V'i=l ,n}. 
This possibility distribution is unique and is denoted 1t*. 
Then the level of priority of rule (A1,B1) is simply 
computed as N*(•A1vB1) (computed from n*). Then given 
evidence A, and knowledge K, B is a plausible conclusion 
of A in the context B if and only if N*(BIA) > 0, i.e. 
Il*(BAA) > IT*(•BAA). This procedure suffers from the 
problem of blocking of property inheritance as shown in 
the following example. 
K = (p 1'v ..,f, b 1'v f, p fv b, b l'v I} where p =penguin, b = 
bird, f = fly, I = legs. It is well-established that the 
rational inference method classifies the rules of K into 2 
sets of rule: {b 1'v f, b 1'v I} have lower priority than {p l'v 
•f, p l'v b }. It can be encoded in possibilistic logic as 
N(•bvl) � o:; N(•bvf) � o:; N(•pv•f) � p; N(pvb) � p, 
with p > 0:. 
The corresponding minimally specific ranking is such that 
IT*(pAI) = IT*(pA...,l), hence forbidding the conclusion that 
penguins have legs, despite the fact that the rule b l'v I is 
not involved in the conflict between penguins and birds 
with respect to flying. Several solutions have been 
suggested to solve this problem including maximal 
entropy rankings, lexicographic methods and others. Here 
we suggest that weak independence solves the problem. 
Consider the graph induced by the rules of K. 
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Any Bayesian-oriented AI researcher would suggest that I 
is conditionally independent of p in the context of birds 
(which is clearly not true for f). This is intuitive as well: 
If we learn that some bird is in fact a penguin, this does 
not influence our belief that it has legs. The conditional 
extension of weak independence reads 
N(llb) > 0 and N(llb/\p) > 0. 
Here it leads to add the rule P-"b 1--- I to K, i.e., to select 
another ranking of worlds that satisfies also 00-"P-"b) > 
Il(-..1-"P-"b) the level of priority of this rule will be the 
same as p 1--- b and p 1--- -.f. It is clear then that from p and 
K u {p-"b 1--- I} one can deduce I plausibly. 
There is no space to develop this point in detail here. 
However we plan to develop this methodology in the 
future (see, e.g. (Benferhat et al. 1994) for preliminary 
results). A first remark is that we do not use strong 
independence here. Strong independence would have two 
drawbacks 
1) It would introduce equality constraints (here of the 
form N(llp/\b);;:; N(llb)) whose nature is different from 
that of the rules. As a consequence looking for the 
minimally specific possibility distribution that 
satisfies both rule-constraints and independence 
constraints may not lead to a unique solution. This is 
the problem already encountered by Goldzsmidt and 
Pearl (1992) with stratified rankings. The weak 
independence notion avoids this drawback. 
2) It forbids the possibility of adding some contraposed 
rules since N(llp/\ b) ;;:; N(llb) > 0 implies that 
Il(p-"-..1/\b) � Il(-..p/\-.)1\b), i.e., it is forbidden to 
claim that "birds without legs are not penguins" which 
seems to be a natural claim in the context of birds. 
The idea of adding weak independence relationships to a 
rule base is to take advantage of the graphical structure of 
the knowledge base, as Bayesians do, and add just what is 
necessary. Part of the work is already done by the rational 
monotony property, i.e. N(AIB) > 0 and N(-.CIB);;:; 0 does 
imply N(AIB/\C) > 0. However more conditional 
independence assertions are needed to overcome problems 
such as blocking of property inheritance. The problem is 
not to add too many assertions so as to avoid 
inconsistencies. Clearly we should stop imperatively once 
a total ordering of worlds is obtained. On the other hand 
the specification of conditional independence relation is 
extremely flexible and would enable to have tailored 
solutions to many inheritance problems. For instance if 
we add a bird that has no legs (n) to the above knowledge 
base, with rules saying that n 1--- -.1, and n fv b, we can 
solve the problem by "reading on the graph" the proper 
conditional independence assertions while most other 
approaches would fail due to the presence of two conflicts. 
However we cannot adapt the Bayesian methods readily for 
several reasons: here nodes of the graph are literals (not 
propositional variables), and cycles should be allowed (we 
must be able to say that "students are young" but "young 
people are not usually students"). Moreover there is no 
result that allow us to aggregate (via the min operation) a 
conditional possibility distribution into a global joint one 
(see, e.g., Fonck 1993). A third reason is that the weak 
independence relation is non-symmetric, i.e will not be a 
graphoid. Hence the mastering of weak conditional 
independence in the possibilistic setting for the purpose of 
handling exception-tolerant rule-bases is an open line of 
research, although a promising one. 
8 CONCLUSION 
This paper has provided a preliminary but systematic study 
of independence in the framework of possibility theory 
when conditioning is defined in an ordinal way (via the 
min-operation). The case where conditional possibility is 
defined as O(A"C);;:; il(CIA)·O(A) using product instead 
of min has been left for further research. It is also worth 
noticing that we have been working with events (or 
formulas) and not with variables (see (Studeny 1993) for 
an overview of the latter approach). It is well-known that 
in the probabilistic framework, the independence of A and 
B means, in terms of relative frequency, that the number 
of cases where A is true over the number of cases where A 
is false is left unchanged when B is known to be true. In 
the view of independence presented here, it can be checked 
that an analog property holds in terms of orderings: The 
possibilistic ordering between the interpretations with the 
greatest possibility which make A true and those which 
make A false is left unchanged when we restrict ourselves 
to interpretations where B is true. Besides, the 
transparency of probabilistic conditioning with respect to 
negation is closely related to the compositionality of 
probabilities with respect to negation. Similarly, the 
remarkable behavior of the possibilistic dependence and 
independence with respect to disjunction or conjunction 
stems from the fact that possibility measures are 
compositional with respect to disjunction, and necessity 
measures with respect to conjunctions. 
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